Jewish tradition, Christian tradition, logic- and bad exegesis
Here is a thoughtful and morally serious argument in favor of fetal stem cell research. That I find its reasoning dubious and its conclusions morally disastrous does not prevent me from admiring the effort by its author, Michael Rosen, to address the subject rationally and responsibly.
Rosen's argument leans heavily on the Jewish ethical tradition. I am, of course, in much the same position Rosen is in when he tries to conceptualize in terms of Christian theology; the best I can do is the best I can do, since I am, after all, dealing with a theological and ethical tradition other than my own. And ultimately, I am simply not a Jew, any more than Rosen is a Christian; while I can try to make my position comprehensible to those in the Jewish ethical tradition, what that tradition says is simply not the one that is decisive for me, any more than my tradition is decisive for Rosen.
Rosen's argument does not- thankfully- raise the red herring of what would become of embryos harvested, for example, in order to facilitate in vitro fertilization. The deaths of most such embryos is- as supporters of fetal stem cell research rightly point out- fully intended; multiple embroyos are typically implanted in not merely the expectation, but the hope, that most of them will die. If one accepts- and I think, for reasons I'll address in a moment, that the arguments are compelling to anyone willing to follow the logic where it leads- both that human life must be understood to begin at conception, and that any attempt to introduce a distinction among human lives as to intrinsic moral value is to cross a line the Jewish people, more than most, have reason to respect, the lack of a compelling moral objection to in vitro fertilization in the abstract doesn't make it less morally objectionable in the concrete. To argue that one might as well use embryos that are going to be destroyed anyway for a good purpose is seductive, but it ignores the basic reality that serves to promote a breakdown in respect for human life at precisely the moment at which it is arguably in greater danger than in the previous history of the Western world. It does, admittedly, draw attention to the fact that we social conservatives were asleep at the switch when we failed to vociferously object from the outset to a procedure which deliberately creates "excess" human embryos, most of them regarded as expendable.
And on any rational, scientific understanding, life must begin at conception. As arduously as morally serious people of all perspectives on the abortion issue have struggled to find some equally viable (excuse the expression) alternative starting point, there simply is no defensible alternative. "Quickening-" the point at which the fetus can be perceived to move- was once seen as such an alternative by Christian theology. It was based on a scientifically faulty understanding of the biological significance of fetal movement, and had to be abandoned once it was realized that biological processes which can only be described as life were occurring long before.
Once cell division begins, and genetic potential begins to be expressed, you have life. There is no getting around it. And if the life happens to be that of species Homo sapiens, it follows as the night follows the day that it is not wombat life or seahorse life, but human life. All that remains to those who would distinguish its rights from those of more fully developed life is the argument that some human life is worthy of protection, while other human life is not.
Morally serious supporters of legalized abortion, as well as fetal stem-cell research, argue that one ought not to ethically equate the life of, say, a pregnant woman with that of the fetus within her, and that the ethical claims of the fetus grow more compelling as the fetus itself develops. That argument is an attractive one, especially for those of a pragmatic bent. Unfortunately, it forces us to cross a line which simply cannot be firmly drawn anywhere else. In fact, there is no other line which does not finally turn out to be anything other than arbitrary.
Viability? That would draw the line much earlier than many people realize- and confront us with the ethical implications of the current common dilemma- ethically hard to defend no matter how one defines the issues- posed by fetuses at precisely the same stage of development being saved by heroic measures in one part of a given hospital, and killed on their mother's whim in another. Does the age at which life which is human becomes human life change with the development of technology which makes it possible to save human fetuses outside the womb at an earlier stage of development? If so, it's clear that viability is just another arbitrary line which moves to easily to be of any real use.
Should we perhaps define life as beginning at the point at which survival is possible without extraordinary medical intervention? That would mean that babies born even at full term with congenital weaknesses requiring that their lives be preserved by medical intervention are not truly alive in the philosophical sense at all. And our preference for pragmatism over logic in another area of medical ethics- the so-called "right to die" (more accurately described as the right to kill, or at least to be killed) has created yet another conundrum. In our desire to finesse the logically obvious point that to intentionally withhold water and nourishment form a person is to actively cause their death, and not merely to allow a natural process to proceed, we have absurdly decided that the administration of food and water to an individual who cannot avail themselves of them by their own efforts constitutes medical treatment. The implication is obvious: the movement of the point at which a child can logically be said to be alive to the point at which it can feed itself and drink out of a glass!
And finally, all attempts to define the beginning of life anywhere but at conception run afoul of the basic scientific definition of life itself. Where cells are dividing and genetic potential is being expressed, you have life- unless, of course, one is willing to simply ignore what science has to say on the subject. What you end up with then is a completely utilitarian approach to ethics and which arbitrarily excludes any inconvenient information, reasons backward from what one wants to conclude to the facts, and distorts both those facts and logic itself in any way necessary to get where one wants to go. Which is, when all is said and done, precisely what the "pro-choice" position does- unless, of course, it simply cuts the Gordian knot by taking the ethically harrowing (though frighteningly common) position that while abortion is murder, one's reservations about murder ought not to be imposed upon others!
But if life begins at conception, is it truly a human life? Should "quality of life," perhaps, be considered here? Is the life, say, of a mentally retarded child worth less than that of a normal child? How profoundly retarded must the child be before it becomes- in a phrase which I realize is emotionally loaded, but which I use because to avoid its emotional impact is to avoid the very nature of the question- life unworthy of life?
Please be patient with me here. I realize that "the Nazi card" is almost always an ad hominem argument. I do not mean to use it in that way. I do not intend to suggest that anybody- and certainly not advocates of either fetal stem cell research or legalized abortion, and least of all ethically serious Jews such as Mr. Rosen- ought to be compared in any way to the Nazis. My point, rather, is two-fold: first, that to draw "the line in the sand" as to when human life begins anywhere but the only place at which, as a practical matter, a clear, firm line can be drawn- at conception- is simply to allow one's definition to be dictated by the conclusions to which one wants to come on some other ground, and not to follow the logic where it leads. And secondly, good intentions do not necessarily make a position less ethically harrowing: lest the point be missed, many of the Nazi crimes- especially the euthanasia of the old, the mentally challenged, and the chronically sick- were defended- and not always hypocritcally- precisely on the same humanitarian grounds on which some human life is said to be less worthy of protection than others in our society today.
Once one chooses emotion over logic, and allows one's predetermined conclusions to dictate the reasoning one brings to an issue, rather than the reverse, Pandora's box has been opened; one simply cannot control the consequences when other, less ethical people follow suit by using the same arbitrary, utilitarian logic to reach other, unlooked-for and frankly horrifying conclusions. If the life of a living Homo sapiens is not necessarily, in the full moral sense, human life, the motivation for that conclusion need not be humanitarian. It need not even be rational. And that's the point at which things become truly frightening.
The consequence of defining life as beginning other than at conception is itself merely arbitrariness and logical inconsistency; one must, once again, redefine life itself in order to conclude that it begins at any point other than at conception. Perhaps some other such point might be agreed upon, at least for a while- but by the nature of the case it will always be arbitrary. When it becomes inconvenient, it will move again- and finally for no other reason but its own inconvenience.
But once one accepts, in principle, the notion that the life of a human may arbitrarily be defined as not necessarily, in the full moral sense, a human life, one is no more prevented from deciding that race, religion, or any other characteristic defines one out of the human race than that even profound mental retardation does so. What is arbitrary is arbitrary. It is not so much that we are on a "slippery slide" which leads to Auschwicz; the philosophical groundwork has already been laid, if it is the case that not all of the lives of those who belong to our species are of equal intrinsic value.
Is the life of an embryo equal in moral worth to that of, say, a distinguished statesman suffering from Alzheimer's Disease? If not- if the worth of the life of any of our species is ultimately to be found in anything other than his or her very membership in that species, and if it varies from one Homo sapiens to another according to its stage of development, or the degree to which its genetic potential has already been realized, or even the presence or absence of intellect itself...
Well, I've just said it, haven't I? The presence or absence of intellect itself. The fetus may lack it- but what if the statesman, his brain ravaged by Alzheimer's, also lacks it? Why not argue the other way around? The statesman, after all, has lived a full and productive life; doesn't the other life in the equation deserve a similar opportunity? That's the problem with arguing that those whose genetic potential is further along deserve the greater chance to live; most of us, if forced to choose, would if anything give the only remaining life preserver on our sinking boat to the child, not to the old man.
And how do we know that the embryo might not ultimately contribute even more to society than the terminally ill statesman already has- or at least more than he might, even with the benefit of the embryo's death, in the time remaining to him? After all, if it be accepted that there is a difference in intrinsic worth between the life of the statesman and that of the embryo, why should it be the stateman's life that has the greater value?
Mr. Rosen also appeals to the principle of "double effect" in traditional Christian just war theory. Christians traditionally believe that a lesser evil is sometimes justified in order to prevent a greater one. Hence, the waging of World War II by the Allies- as horrible as it was- was a morally responsible act, because the alternative- the triumph of Hitler- would have been worse. But the problem with his analogy is that it requires the conclusion that the death of the embryo is a lesser evil than it would be for the statesman to go unhealed, and finally to die. But that conclusion is defensible only on the purely arbitrary basis that one human life is ever intrinsically more valuable than another- a premise which, once accepted, forever deprives one of the ability to decide who should live and who should die except on arbitrary grounds which may not in all cases be chosen by benign or even morally admissible criteria.
But the embryo would be destroyed anyway! In view of that fact, isn't it morally preferable that its death give life to someone else? Perhaps. But there is another factor in the equation- one which supporters of fetal stem cell research are not disposed to consider- or at least to mention. Some are very much aware of it indeed.
For the death of embryos to become effectively the key to curing Altzheimer's disease- or any of the other illnesses for which a cure from fetal stem cell research is touted as a likely outcome- would inevitably mean that it would no merely be longer be "spare" embryos which would be used. Already many advocates of fetal stem cell research are moving from a position merely advocating the use of embryos which would be destroyed anyway to demanding the right to create new ones for the specific purpose of cannibalizing them for research. Should that research be fruitless, of course, it would clearly not be a good sufficient to outweigh the evil of the destruction of the embryos. But should it succeed, the consequences of Rosen's argument would be far worse. On one side would be the benefit to people who suffer from the various diseases from which fetal stem cell research might provide treatments, and perhaps cures. On the other would be the institutionalization- and, even more deadly, the general acceptance- of a massive and quite intentional destruction of certain human lives in order that other humans might benefit.
You say we already to that in order to foster in vitro fertilization, and that that's where those embryos come from in the first place? Yep. And that's why, in the present state of technology, in vitro fertilization needs to be opposed. Again, the good that comes of it- children for childless couples- is simply overwhelmed by the evil of many more human lives intentionally terminated, and the conscience of society further seared.
In any case, Mr. Rosen's attempt to apply "double effect" theory to the fetal stem cell issue utterly fails. To create stem-cell lines for the specific purpose of research is, in fact, wrong in itself; human life is not a means to an end! And to argue that the death of an embryo is merely a result of the extraction of its stem cells for the purpose of achieving a good end rather than the means of its death is ethical sophistry at its worst, a formally legitimate distinction without any real ethical difference. Very frankly, it's the kind of vapid reasoning which causes me to distrust Thomism- a distrust in which I am anything but alone, certainly outside Roman Catholicism!
In short, I find Mr. Rosen's argument that the destruction of embryos in order to achieve cures for even dreadful diseases is in fact the substitution of a lesser evil for a greater one unconvincing, especially given the consequences to society posed by its acceptance. Those seem to me to include the spread of a sickness of the soul far graver than the tragic illnesses for which cures are sought in fetal stem cells. Where attitudes and decisions on matters involving the status and sanctity of human life itself are removed from the realm of reasoned principle and thrown into the chaotic arena of arbitrary utilitarianism, none of us are safe- and least of all, our souls.
It is not my intention to critique the therapeutic lens Mr. Rosen ascribes to ethical decision-making in the Jewish tradition, beyond saying that I, as a non-Jew, do not find it convincing. But if I did, I would reply that the sickness the general acceptance of fetal stem cell research would unleash on society is far more deadly than any it might help to cure.
There is one more matter addressed by Mr. Rosen which I feel compelled to touch upon: his rather odd exegesis of Exodus 21:22-23. It caught my attention because I recall the same exegesis being used to defend abortion at a synod assembly during my days as an ELCA pastor.
I'll begin with his own quotation of the verse, which he acknowledges is "treacherously difficult to translate," but whose meaning, he argues, is "clear." I think we'll see that it's not nearly as clear as he suggests- unless one forces the text to obey one's own arbitrary presuppositions, as Mr. Rosen does by his parenthetical inclusions in the English version of the text he gives:
Mr. Rosen is quite emphatic in his interpretation of this verse- far more emphatic, in fact, than the text itself allows:
What Jewish tradition may or may not "universally acknowledge," I cannot say. But the problem with Mr. Rosen's interpretation of the passage becomes clear when the same passage is cited from the Bible itself (I'm using the New King James version, but pretty much any translation of the bare text without Mr. Rosen's parenthetical inclusions will make the same point):
The text is, indeed, a difficult one, and it might be well to begin with what is certain: the text itself offers no support whatsoever for Mr. Rosen's arbitrary assumptions (presumably shared "unanimously" by Jewish scholars) either that the fetus dies in either case, or that the "harm" to which the text refers is harm to the woman. In fact, a strong case can be made that the actual text of the verses (again, with Mr. Rosen's parenthetical commentary removed), conveys precisely the opposite information! After all, it tells us-in so many words- that the woman is "injured" (Mr. Rosen's translation), or "hurt" (the NKJV)- in other words, harmed! On the other hand, if there is someone who might or might not have been harmed, there is only one party involved about whom the question might be asked: the fetus!
Were I to resort to Mr. Rosen's style of citation, I might well give the more natural understanding of the text- and arguably, the only one which does not do violence to it- as follows:
This is, in fact, the traditional Christian interpretation of the verse- and again, one which has the advantage of being more exegetically defensible than Mr. Rosen's. And if that passage is understood in this way, it would seem that the first commandment God gives about human beings prior to birth emphatically equates the born and the unborn, specifically prescribing death as the penalty for killing either one!
I can't speak to the Jewish tradition. But Mr. Rosen's odd use of Exodus 21- whether or not Jewish tradition supports it- does serve as a lurid illustration of what happens when one substitutes arbitrary preference for rigorous logic in matters of God's will concerning life and death.
Rosen's argument leans heavily on the Jewish ethical tradition. I am, of course, in much the same position Rosen is in when he tries to conceptualize in terms of Christian theology; the best I can do is the best I can do, since I am, after all, dealing with a theological and ethical tradition other than my own. And ultimately, I am simply not a Jew, any more than Rosen is a Christian; while I can try to make my position comprehensible to those in the Jewish ethical tradition, what that tradition says is simply not the one that is decisive for me, any more than my tradition is decisive for Rosen.
Rosen's argument does not- thankfully- raise the red herring of what would become of embryos harvested, for example, in order to facilitate in vitro fertilization. The deaths of most such embryos is- as supporters of fetal stem cell research rightly point out- fully intended; multiple embroyos are typically implanted in not merely the expectation, but the hope, that most of them will die. If one accepts- and I think, for reasons I'll address in a moment, that the arguments are compelling to anyone willing to follow the logic where it leads- both that human life must be understood to begin at conception, and that any attempt to introduce a distinction among human lives as to intrinsic moral value is to cross a line the Jewish people, more than most, have reason to respect, the lack of a compelling moral objection to in vitro fertilization in the abstract doesn't make it less morally objectionable in the concrete. To argue that one might as well use embryos that are going to be destroyed anyway for a good purpose is seductive, but it ignores the basic reality that serves to promote a breakdown in respect for human life at precisely the moment at which it is arguably in greater danger than in the previous history of the Western world. It does, admittedly, draw attention to the fact that we social conservatives were asleep at the switch when we failed to vociferously object from the outset to a procedure which deliberately creates "excess" human embryos, most of them regarded as expendable.
And on any rational, scientific understanding, life must begin at conception. As arduously as morally serious people of all perspectives on the abortion issue have struggled to find some equally viable (excuse the expression) alternative starting point, there simply is no defensible alternative. "Quickening-" the point at which the fetus can be perceived to move- was once seen as such an alternative by Christian theology. It was based on a scientifically faulty understanding of the biological significance of fetal movement, and had to be abandoned once it was realized that biological processes which can only be described as life were occurring long before.
Once cell division begins, and genetic potential begins to be expressed, you have life. There is no getting around it. And if the life happens to be that of species Homo sapiens, it follows as the night follows the day that it is not wombat life or seahorse life, but human life. All that remains to those who would distinguish its rights from those of more fully developed life is the argument that some human life is worthy of protection, while other human life is not.
Morally serious supporters of legalized abortion, as well as fetal stem-cell research, argue that one ought not to ethically equate the life of, say, a pregnant woman with that of the fetus within her, and that the ethical claims of the fetus grow more compelling as the fetus itself develops. That argument is an attractive one, especially for those of a pragmatic bent. Unfortunately, it forces us to cross a line which simply cannot be firmly drawn anywhere else. In fact, there is no other line which does not finally turn out to be anything other than arbitrary.
Viability? That would draw the line much earlier than many people realize- and confront us with the ethical implications of the current common dilemma- ethically hard to defend no matter how one defines the issues- posed by fetuses at precisely the same stage of development being saved by heroic measures in one part of a given hospital, and killed on their mother's whim in another. Does the age at which life which is human becomes human life change with the development of technology which makes it possible to save human fetuses outside the womb at an earlier stage of development? If so, it's clear that viability is just another arbitrary line which moves to easily to be of any real use.
Should we perhaps define life as beginning at the point at which survival is possible without extraordinary medical intervention? That would mean that babies born even at full term with congenital weaknesses requiring that their lives be preserved by medical intervention are not truly alive in the philosophical sense at all. And our preference for pragmatism over logic in another area of medical ethics- the so-called "right to die" (more accurately described as the right to kill, or at least to be killed) has created yet another conundrum. In our desire to finesse the logically obvious point that to intentionally withhold water and nourishment form a person is to actively cause their death, and not merely to allow a natural process to proceed, we have absurdly decided that the administration of food and water to an individual who cannot avail themselves of them by their own efforts constitutes medical treatment. The implication is obvious: the movement of the point at which a child can logically be said to be alive to the point at which it can feed itself and drink out of a glass!
And finally, all attempts to define the beginning of life anywhere but at conception run afoul of the basic scientific definition of life itself. Where cells are dividing and genetic potential is being expressed, you have life- unless, of course, one is willing to simply ignore what science has to say on the subject. What you end up with then is a completely utilitarian approach to ethics and which arbitrarily excludes any inconvenient information, reasons backward from what one wants to conclude to the facts, and distorts both those facts and logic itself in any way necessary to get where one wants to go. Which is, when all is said and done, precisely what the "pro-choice" position does- unless, of course, it simply cuts the Gordian knot by taking the ethically harrowing (though frighteningly common) position that while abortion is murder, one's reservations about murder ought not to be imposed upon others!
But if life begins at conception, is it truly a human life? Should "quality of life," perhaps, be considered here? Is the life, say, of a mentally retarded child worth less than that of a normal child? How profoundly retarded must the child be before it becomes- in a phrase which I realize is emotionally loaded, but which I use because to avoid its emotional impact is to avoid the very nature of the question- life unworthy of life?
Please be patient with me here. I realize that "the Nazi card" is almost always an ad hominem argument. I do not mean to use it in that way. I do not intend to suggest that anybody- and certainly not advocates of either fetal stem cell research or legalized abortion, and least of all ethically serious Jews such as Mr. Rosen- ought to be compared in any way to the Nazis. My point, rather, is two-fold: first, that to draw "the line in the sand" as to when human life begins anywhere but the only place at which, as a practical matter, a clear, firm line can be drawn- at conception- is simply to allow one's definition to be dictated by the conclusions to which one wants to come on some other ground, and not to follow the logic where it leads. And secondly, good intentions do not necessarily make a position less ethically harrowing: lest the point be missed, many of the Nazi crimes- especially the euthanasia of the old, the mentally challenged, and the chronically sick- were defended- and not always hypocritcally- precisely on the same humanitarian grounds on which some human life is said to be less worthy of protection than others in our society today.
Once one chooses emotion over logic, and allows one's predetermined conclusions to dictate the reasoning one brings to an issue, rather than the reverse, Pandora's box has been opened; one simply cannot control the consequences when other, less ethical people follow suit by using the same arbitrary, utilitarian logic to reach other, unlooked-for and frankly horrifying conclusions. If the life of a living Homo sapiens is not necessarily, in the full moral sense, human life, the motivation for that conclusion need not be humanitarian. It need not even be rational. And that's the point at which things become truly frightening.
The consequence of defining life as beginning other than at conception is itself merely arbitrariness and logical inconsistency; one must, once again, redefine life itself in order to conclude that it begins at any point other than at conception. Perhaps some other such point might be agreed upon, at least for a while- but by the nature of the case it will always be arbitrary. When it becomes inconvenient, it will move again- and finally for no other reason but its own inconvenience.
But once one accepts, in principle, the notion that the life of a human may arbitrarily be defined as not necessarily, in the full moral sense, a human life, one is no more prevented from deciding that race, religion, or any other characteristic defines one out of the human race than that even profound mental retardation does so. What is arbitrary is arbitrary. It is not so much that we are on a "slippery slide" which leads to Auschwicz; the philosophical groundwork has already been laid, if it is the case that not all of the lives of those who belong to our species are of equal intrinsic value.
Is the life of an embryo equal in moral worth to that of, say, a distinguished statesman suffering from Alzheimer's Disease? If not- if the worth of the life of any of our species is ultimately to be found in anything other than his or her very membership in that species, and if it varies from one Homo sapiens to another according to its stage of development, or the degree to which its genetic potential has already been realized, or even the presence or absence of intellect itself...
Well, I've just said it, haven't I? The presence or absence of intellect itself. The fetus may lack it- but what if the statesman, his brain ravaged by Alzheimer's, also lacks it? Why not argue the other way around? The statesman, after all, has lived a full and productive life; doesn't the other life in the equation deserve a similar opportunity? That's the problem with arguing that those whose genetic potential is further along deserve the greater chance to live; most of us, if forced to choose, would if anything give the only remaining life preserver on our sinking boat to the child, not to the old man.
And how do we know that the embryo might not ultimately contribute even more to society than the terminally ill statesman already has- or at least more than he might, even with the benefit of the embryo's death, in the time remaining to him? After all, if it be accepted that there is a difference in intrinsic worth between the life of the statesman and that of the embryo, why should it be the stateman's life that has the greater value?
Mr. Rosen also appeals to the principle of "double effect" in traditional Christian just war theory. Christians traditionally believe that a lesser evil is sometimes justified in order to prevent a greater one. Hence, the waging of World War II by the Allies- as horrible as it was- was a morally responsible act, because the alternative- the triumph of Hitler- would have been worse. But the problem with his analogy is that it requires the conclusion that the death of the embryo is a lesser evil than it would be for the statesman to go unhealed, and finally to die. But that conclusion is defensible only on the purely arbitrary basis that one human life is ever intrinsically more valuable than another- a premise which, once accepted, forever deprives one of the ability to decide who should live and who should die except on arbitrary grounds which may not in all cases be chosen by benign or even morally admissible criteria.
But the embryo would be destroyed anyway! In view of that fact, isn't it morally preferable that its death give life to someone else? Perhaps. But there is another factor in the equation- one which supporters of fetal stem cell research are not disposed to consider- or at least to mention. Some are very much aware of it indeed.
For the death of embryos to become effectively the key to curing Altzheimer's disease- or any of the other illnesses for which a cure from fetal stem cell research is touted as a likely outcome- would inevitably mean that it would no merely be longer be "spare" embryos which would be used. Already many advocates of fetal stem cell research are moving from a position merely advocating the use of embryos which would be destroyed anyway to demanding the right to create new ones for the specific purpose of cannibalizing them for research. Should that research be fruitless, of course, it would clearly not be a good sufficient to outweigh the evil of the destruction of the embryos. But should it succeed, the consequences of Rosen's argument would be far worse. On one side would be the benefit to people who suffer from the various diseases from which fetal stem cell research might provide treatments, and perhaps cures. On the other would be the institutionalization- and, even more deadly, the general acceptance- of a massive and quite intentional destruction of certain human lives in order that other humans might benefit.
You say we already to that in order to foster in vitro fertilization, and that that's where those embryos come from in the first place? Yep. And that's why, in the present state of technology, in vitro fertilization needs to be opposed. Again, the good that comes of it- children for childless couples- is simply overwhelmed by the evil of many more human lives intentionally terminated, and the conscience of society further seared.
In any case, Mr. Rosen's attempt to apply "double effect" theory to the fetal stem cell issue utterly fails. To create stem-cell lines for the specific purpose of research is, in fact, wrong in itself; human life is not a means to an end! And to argue that the death of an embryo is merely a result of the extraction of its stem cells for the purpose of achieving a good end rather than the means of its death is ethical sophistry at its worst, a formally legitimate distinction without any real ethical difference. Very frankly, it's the kind of vapid reasoning which causes me to distrust Thomism- a distrust in which I am anything but alone, certainly outside Roman Catholicism!
In short, I find Mr. Rosen's argument that the destruction of embryos in order to achieve cures for even dreadful diseases is in fact the substitution of a lesser evil for a greater one unconvincing, especially given the consequences to society posed by its acceptance. Those seem to me to include the spread of a sickness of the soul far graver than the tragic illnesses for which cures are sought in fetal stem cells. Where attitudes and decisions on matters involving the status and sanctity of human life itself are removed from the realm of reasoned principle and thrown into the chaotic arena of arbitrary utilitarianism, none of us are safe- and least of all, our souls.
It is not my intention to critique the therapeutic lens Mr. Rosen ascribes to ethical decision-making in the Jewish tradition, beyond saying that I, as a non-Jew, do not find it convincing. But if I did, I would reply that the sickness the general acceptance of fetal stem cell research would unleash on society is far more deadly than any it might help to cure.
There is one more matter addressed by Mr. Rosen which I feel compelled to touch upon: his rather odd exegesis of Exodus 21:22-23. It caught my attention because I recall the same exegesis being used to defend abortion at a synod assembly during my days as an ELCA pastor.
I'll begin with his own quotation of the verse, which he acknowledges is "treacherously difficult to translate," but whose meaning, he argues, is "clear." I think we'll see that it's not nearly as clear as he suggests- unless one forces the text to obey one's own arbitrary presuppositions, as Mr. Rosen does by his parenthetical inclusions in the English version of the text he gives:
If two men struggle and injure a woman who is pregnant so that her offspring be expelled, but there be not harm (befalling her) then (the injurer) shall be fined as the woman's husband shall determine, and the matter shall be referred to the judges. But if there be harm (befalling her), then you shall give life for life.
Mr. Rosen is quite emphatic in his interpretation of this verse- far more emphatic, in fact, than the text itself allows:
As I explained last year, the universally recognized understanding of these crucial verses is that a punishment is more severe than a mere monetary fine is imposed only if the woman-- not the fetus-- is killed (the fetus presumably dies in both situations). Thus, the first commandment God issues concerning human beings prior to birth distinguishes sharply between the born and the unborn.
What Jewish tradition may or may not "universally acknowledge," I cannot say. But the problem with Mr. Rosen's interpretation of the passage becomes clear when the same passage is cited from the Bible itself (I'm using the New King James version, but pretty much any translation of the bare text without Mr. Rosen's parenthetical inclusions will make the same point):
If men fight, and hurt a woman with child, so that she gives birth prematurely, yet no harm follows, he shall surely be punished accordingly as the woman's husband imposes on him; he shall pay as the judges determine. But if any harm follows, he shall give life for life.
The text is, indeed, a difficult one, and it might be well to begin with what is certain: the text itself offers no support whatsoever for Mr. Rosen's arbitrary assumptions (presumably shared "unanimously" by Jewish scholars) either that the fetus dies in either case, or that the "harm" to which the text refers is harm to the woman. In fact, a strong case can be made that the actual text of the verses (again, with Mr. Rosen's parenthetical commentary removed), conveys precisely the opposite information! After all, it tells us-in so many words- that the woman is "injured" (Mr. Rosen's translation), or "hurt" (the NKJV)- in other words, harmed! On the other hand, if there is someone who might or might not have been harmed, there is only one party involved about whom the question might be asked: the fetus!
Were I to resort to Mr. Rosen's style of citation, I might well give the more natural understanding of the text- and arguably, the only one which does not do violence to it- as follows:
If two men struggle and injure a woman so that her offspring be expelled, but there be not harm (to the offspring), then (the injurer) shall be fined as the woman's husband shall determine, and the matter shall be referred to the judges. But if there be harm befalling (the offspring), then you shall give life for life.
This is, in fact, the traditional Christian interpretation of the verse- and again, one which has the advantage of being more exegetically defensible than Mr. Rosen's. And if that passage is understood in this way, it would seem that the first commandment God gives about human beings prior to birth emphatically equates the born and the unborn, specifically prescribing death as the penalty for killing either one!
I can't speak to the Jewish tradition. But Mr. Rosen's odd use of Exodus 21- whether or not Jewish tradition supports it- does serve as a lurid illustration of what happens when one substitutes arbitrary preference for rigorous logic in matters of God's will concerning life and death.
Comments
The challenge is to help people see through the superficial emotionality and to aid them in resisting the sidetracking. You have your work cut out for you in a culture which thrives on superficial emotions (note the spontaneous shrines which crop up after the death of teenagers in a community or of a celebrity like Dianna). The task is even more daunting when one observes the lack of attention on many people's part, so that sidetracking is accomplished with the greatest of ease. Add to that the frustration of having to chase the emotions and diversions as if one were engaging in exegesis with a Jehovah's Witness and you have a formidable task. Thank you for the clarity and perseverence needed for the task.
Think of what we could prove using THAT tactic.